Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2008

Debbie Haggard v. Workforce Appeals Board of the
Utah Department of Workforce Services, Accent
Surfaces : Brief of Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Debbie Haggard; Petitioner, Pro se.
Suzan Pixton; Attorney for Respondent.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Haggard v. Workforce Appeals Board of the Utah Department of Workforce Services, No. 20080690 (Utah Court of
Appeals, 2008).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/1103

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH i

v..F APPEALS

DEBBIE HAGGARD,
Petitioner,
Mo. 2008UoyO-CA
v.
WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD,
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
WORKFORCE SERVICES, and
ACCENT SURFACES,

. ...

No. 7

Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
Petition for Review of a Dec".
Workforce Appeals Boara c
Depa. •
' Workforce Ser
"Utah

DEBBIE HAGGARD
PETITIONER, PRO SE
6422 WEST 3860 SOUTH
WEST VALLEY CITY UT 84128

SI'
J N #2608
14
: SOUTH
PO ksu^ ^ 4 4
SALT T AKF. CITY UT 84145-0244
Attorney for Respondent
Workforce Appeals Board of the
Utah Department of Workforce
Services

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
DEBBIE HAGGARD,
Petitioner,
Case No. 20080690-CA
v.
WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD,
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
WORKFORCE SERVICES, and
ACCENT SURFACES,

Priority No. 7

Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Workforce Appeals Board of the
Department of Workforce Services,
State of Utah

DEBBIE HAGGARD
PETITIONER, PRO SE
6422 WEST 3860 SOUTH
WEST VALLEY CITY UT 84128-3545

SUZAN PIXTON #2608
140 EAST 300 SOUTH
PO BOX 45244
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84145-0244
Attorney for Respondent
Workforce Appeals Board of the
Utah Department of Workforce
Services

TABLE OF CONTENTS
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

1

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW / STANDARD OF REVIEW

1

STATUTES AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS AT ISSUE

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and

B.

Disposition Below

2

Statement of the Facts

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

5

POINT I

5
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S CREDIBILITY
DETERMINATION IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE
AND SHOULD BE UPHELD.

POINT II

8
THE EMPLOYER HAD JUST CAUSE FOR DISCHARGING
THE CLAIMANT.

POINT III

12

THE CLAIMANT'S NEW EVIDENCE ON APPEAL
SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED.
POINT IV

14

T H E CLAIMANT'S A L L E G A T I O N S OF D I S C R I M I N A T I O N

ARE NOT RELEVANT AND ARE NEW EVIDENCE.
CONCLUSION

15
i

ADDENDUM A - Determinative Statutes and Rules
ADDENDUM B - Decision of the Department Representative
ADDENDUM C - Decision of the Administrative Law Judge
ADDENDUM D - Decisions of the Workforce Appeals Board
ADDENDUM E - References to the record

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED
Bhatia v Department of Employment See,
834 P.2d 574, 577 (Utah App. 1992)

8

Crockett v. Crockett,
836 P.2d 818 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)

16

Drake v. Industrial Comm fn,
939 P.2d 177 (Utah 1977) and Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(g)
Gibson v. Department of Employment Sec,
840 P.2d 780, 783 (Utah App. 1992)

1
1, 2, 10

Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review,
776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)

7, 17

Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc.,
872 P.2d 1051 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)
Pro-Benefit Staffing v. Board of Review,
775 P.2d 439, 443 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
Salt Lake City Corp. v. Department ofEmp. Sec,
657 P.2d 1312, 1312 (Utah, 1982)
West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co.,
818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)
ii

16

1
6, 7

16

STATUTES
' •c V-4-307, Utah Code Annotated
I
§35A-4-405(2)(a), Utah Code Annotated
§35A-4-508(8)(a), i ;^.- •.

* -ii CuJc Annotated
R994-405-201, Utah Administrative Code
i

I

R994-405-202, Utah Administrative •: u^I
R994-508-305, Utah Administrative (Yule

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
This court has jurisdiction of this Petition for Review pursuant to Article 8, §3 of
the Utah Constitution; Utah Code Ann, §§35A-4-508(8)(a), 78A-4-103(2)(a), 63G-4-403;
and Rule 14 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did the Workforce Appeals Board have substantial evidence to support the finding
the claimant was discharged from her employment with just cause?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The claimant challenges the finding by the ALJ and the Board that the employees
testimony was more credible than the claimant's, which is a question of fact, and the
standard of review is "highly deferential, requiring reversal only if the finding is clearly
erroneous . . . and not supported by substantial evidence." Drake v. Industrial Comm'n,
939 P.2d 177 (Utah 1997) and Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(g)
The question of whether the employer had just cause to terminate the claimant is
a mixed question of law and fact under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. In ProBenefit Staffing v. Board of Review, 775 P.2d 439, 443 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) this court
held that as to the determination of whether the employer had just cause to discharge the
claimant: "we will not disturb the Board's application of its factual findings to the law

unless its determination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality." See also
Gibson v. Department of Employment Sec., 840 P.2d 780, 783 (Utah App. 1992):
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[T]he legislature has granted the Board discretion in determining whether
an employee was terminated for just cause, [citations omitted]
"Accordingly, we will reverse the Board's decision only if we determine that
it is unreasonable or irrational." [citations omitted]

STATUTES AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS AT ISSUE
The statutes and rules which are determinative in this matter are set forth verbatim
in Addendum A, and include the following:
§35A-4-307, Utah Code Annotated (2008)
§35A-4-405(2)(a), Utah Code Annotated (2008)
§35A-4-508(8)(a), Utah Code Annotated (2008)
§63G-4-403, Utah Code Annotated (2008)
§78A-4-103(2)(a), Utah Code Annotated (2008)
R994-405-201, Utah Administrative Code (2008)
R994-405-202, Utah Administrative Code (2008)
R994-508-305, Utah Administrative Code (2008)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below.
This is an appeal from an unemployment compensation decision by the Workforce

Appeals Board (Board) of the Department of Workforce Services (Department).
The claimant, Debbie G. Haggard, filed a claim for unemployment insurance
benefits after her employment was terminated by the employer, Accent Surfaces. A
decision was issued by a Department representative, who found the claimant had been
discharged from her job for just cause and was ineligible for benefits under the Utah
Employment Security Act §35A-4-405(2)(a). (All Utah Code provisions are found
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sequentially at Addendum A, Department decisions at Addendum B.) The employer was
relieved of benefit charges under §35A-4-307 of the Act.
The claimant appealed the Department decision to an administrative law judge
(ALJ) who determined, after an evidentiary hearing at which both parties provided sworn
testimony, that the claimant had been discharged from her employment for just cause.
Because the employer met its burden of proof in establishing the claimant was terminated
for just cause, the employer was found eligible for relief of benefit costs paid to the
claimant. (See Addendum C) The claimant appealed the decision to the Workforce
Appeals Board.

The Board unanimously upheld the decision of the ALJ. (See

Addendum D) The claimant filed this Petition for Review seeking review of the Board's
decision.
B

Statement of the Facts.
The Workforce Appeals Board supplements and corrects the claimant's Statement

of the Facts as follows:
The claimant worked in the accounting department for Accent Surfaces from
January 2006 to May 15, 2008. (Record, 9:33-34) The claimant was discharged for
making an inappropriate remark at work. (R, 9:40-41) She filed for unemployment
benefits on May 15, 2008. (R, 5:22-23)
On September 19, 2007, the claimant engaged in an email correspondence with a

coworker in which the claimant made inappropriate remarks about coworkers using foul
language. (R, 8:6-15; 9:40-41) On January 16,2006, the claimant acknowledged receipt
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of employer policy that prohibited this type of communication. (R, 6:24-26; 7:7-9) As a
result of this incident, in conjunction with the claimant's poor relationship with her
supervisor and reports of making disparaging remarks in reference to other employees,
Suzanne Martin, the comptroller, was prepared to discharge the claimant on October 22,
2007. (R, 6:44) The claimant committed to improve her behavior and the decision to
discharge the claimant was changed to a warning. (R, 7:1-2)
Following this incident, the claimant's behavior improved temporarily, but Ms.
Martin eventually began receiving complaints that the claimant was talking negatively
about coworkers and spreading rumors. (R, 12:4-7; 19:16-19) Ms. Martin confronted the
claimant about the complaints on March 18,2008, but the claimant denied the allegations.
(R, 12:21-29) The claimant was again warned that spreading rumors and talking
negatively of coworkers would not be tolerated. (R, 12:21-24)
On May 8, 2008, the claimant was asked by Ms. Martin to retrieve some files,
which the claimant felt was not her responsibility. The claimant commented to Michelle
Baker, a receptionist, "I guess that you and I are Suzanne's little niggers." (R, 16:31-39)
Ms. Baker reported the remark to Ms. Martin on May 12, 2008. (R, 17:9) Ms. Baker
testified during the hearing that there was no confusion about what the claimant said and
Ms. Baker clearly heard the claimant use the word "niggers". (R, 16:29-39)
The employer employs individuals of various ethnic backgrounds and it cannot
tolerate racial remarks due to the psychological impact it might have on certain employees.
(R, 13:15-16) This type of communication is also covered in the employer's policy and
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is grounds for immediate termination. (R? 13:16-18) The final incident was evaluated and
the claimant was discharged on May 15, 2008.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The claimant's arguments that she was not terminated for just cause are inherently
inconsistent and not supported by the weight of the credible evidence. The decision of the
Board was neither arbitrary nor capricious.
The administrative law judge is in the best position to determine credibility of the
witnesses and the employer's testimony was more credible than the claimant's. There is
substantial evidence to support the Board's findings and conclusions. The claimant was
discharged with just cause as the employer met its burden to establish all of the elements
of a just cause discharge.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW
JUDGE'S
CREDIBILITY DETERMINATION IS SUPPORTED
BY THE EVIDENCE AND SHOULD BE UPHELD.
This case centers around the claimant's behavior at work. Other employees had
complained about the claimant's gossiping, name calling, and divisive behavior. The
employer presented emails sent by the claimant calling other employees "fat asses",
"ugly", and in a derisive way, "little princesses." The employer had given the claimant
specific warnings about her behavior. After receiving warnings, the claimant's behavior
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improved but only for a short period of time. The final incident occurred when a
supervisor, Suzanne Martin, asked the claimant and another employee, Ms. Baker, to pull
some files. The claimant was apparently unhappy about the assignment and said to Ms.
Baker, "I guess you and I are Suzanne's little niggers." The claimant denied using those
words and testified she said: "I guess you and I are Suzanne's little you know what." She
testified she meant gopher.
Both parties to the conversation, Ms. Baker and the claimant, testified during the
hearing. The ALJ found Ms. Baker to be more credible and found the claimant did in fact
say "little niggers". There is ample, competent evidence in the record to support that
credibility finding. The employer explained that it has a multi-racial workforce and the
claimant's use of that word would cause problems with other workers.
The claimant had received warnings about her divisive behavior which included
name calling and gossiping about other employees. In October 2008, the employer was
prepared to discharge the claimant for her obj ectionable behavior. The employer met with
the claimant in October about the intended discharge. The claimant promised the
employer she would stop the objectionable behavior and the employer decided to give her
another chance.
The case rests on the credibility of the claimant and Ms. Baker. If the claimant said
"little you know what", by which she meant "gopher", as she alleges she did, it would not
be grounds for termination.

The trier of fact is the appropriate entity to make

determinations regarding credibility and those determinations should not be disturbed on
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appeal short of clear evidence of abuse. As the Utah Supreme Court has held: "It is for
the administrative agency, and not this court, to choose between conflicting facts." Salt
Lake City Corp. v. Department ofEmp. Sec., 657 P.2d 1312, 1312 (Utah, 1982). This
court is limited in its review and cannot alter the findings of fact, as found by the ALJ and
upheld by the Board, absent clear error. The correct issue before the court is whether the
ALJPs findings, as adopted by the Board, are supported by substantial evidence in the
record, which this court has defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Grace Drilling v. Board of Review, 776
P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
This court has further held:
We defer to the Board's assessment of conflicting evidence. We are in no
position to second guess the detailed findings of the ALJ which were
adopted by the Board. It is not our role to judge the relative credibility of
witnesses. "In undertaking such a review, this court will not substitute its
judgement as between two reasonably conflicting views, even though we
may have come to a different conclusion had the case come before us for de
novo review. (Citation omitted). "It is the province of the Board, not
appellate courts, to resolve conflicting evidence, and where inconsistent
inferences be drawn from the same evidence, it is for the Board to draw the
inferences. (Citations omitted). Albertsons, Inc. v. Department of
Employment Sec, 854 P.2d 570, 575 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
The finder of facts in this case was the ALJ, who had the opportunity to participate
in the hearing and question the claimant and the employer witnesses. There is substantial
evidence in the record to support the ALJ's credibility determination and it should not be

disturbed.
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There is ample evidence to support the ALJ's credibility determination. The
claimant's version of the conversation is self-serving. She knows if she admits to saying
something objectionable, she will be discharged. At the same time, there does not appear
to be any reason for Ms. Baker to lie. Additionally, in support of the credibility
determination, the claimant sent emails that support the allegation that she engaged in
inappropriate language and name calling. The credibility determination should be upheld.
POINT II
THE EMPLOYER HAD JUST
DISCHARGING THE CLAIMANT.

CAUSE

FOR

A claimant is eligible for unemployment benefits if discharged without just cause
as defined in Utah Administrative Code R994-405-202, set forth in Addendum A. In
establishing whether the claimant was terminated for just cause, the employer has the
burden of proving: (1) the claimant's culpability; (2) her knowledge of expected conduct;
and (3) that the offending conduct was within the claimant's control. See Bhatia v.
Department of Employment Sec, 834 P.2d 574, 577 (Utah App. 1992). The employer
must establish each of the three elements in order for the Board to deny benefits. Id. at
577. The employer met its burden to prove all of the elements in this case.
Utah Code Ann. §35A-4-405(2)(a) (2008) states, in part:
35A-4-405. Ineligibility for benefits.
An individual is ineligible for benefits or for purposes of establishing a
waiting period:
(2) (a) For the week in which the claimant was discharged for just cause or
for an act or omission in connection with employment, not constituting a
8

crime, which is deliberate, willful, or wanton and adverse to the employer's
rightful interest, if so found by the division....
Utah Admin. Code R994-405-201 (2005) provides:
R994-405-201. Discharge - Genu ;il IMmihuii.
A separation is a discharge if the employer was the moving party in
determining the date the employment ended. Benefits shall be denied if the
claimant was discharged for just cause or for an act or omission in
connection with employment, not constituting a crime, which was
deliberate, willful, or wanton and adverse to the employer's rightful interest.
However, not every legitimate cause for discharge justifies a denial of
benefits. A just cause discharge must include some fault on the part of
the worker, A reduction of force is considered a discharge without just
cause at the convenience of the employer. [Emphasis supplied.]
The basic elements established by Utah Admin. Code R994-405-202 (2005) which
are essential for a determination for a just cause discharge are:
(1) Culpability.
The conduct causing the discharge must be so serious that continuing the
employment relationship would j eopardize the employer's rightful interest.
If the conduct was an isolated incident of poor judgment and there was no
expectation that it would be continued or repeated, potential harm may not
be shown. The claimant's prior work record is an important factor in
determining whether the conduct was an isolated incident or a good faith
error in judgment. A long term employee with an established pattern of
complying with the employer's rules may not demonstrate by a single
violation, even though harmful, that the infraction would be repeated. In
this instance, depending on the seriousness of the conduct, it may not be
necessary for the employer to discharge the claimant to avoid future harm.
(2) Knowledge.
The worker must have had knowledge of the conduct the employer
expected. There does not need to be evidence of a deliberate intent to harm
the employer; however, it must be shown that the worker should have been
able to anticipate the negative effect of the conduct. Generally, knowledge
may not be established unless the employer gave a clear explanation of the
expected behavior or had a written policy, except in the case of a violation
9

of a universal standard of conduct. A specific warning is one way to show
the worker had knowledge of the expected conduct. After a warning the
worker should have been given an opportunity to correct the objectionable
conduct. If the employer had a progressive disciplinary procedure in place
at the time of the separation, it generally must have been followed for
knowledge to be established, except in the case of very severe infractions,
including criminal actions.
(3) Control.
(a) The conduct causing the discharge must have been within the claimant's
control. Isolated instances of carelessness or good faith errors in judgment
are not sufficient to establish just cause for discharge. However, continued
inefficiency, repeated carelessness or evidence of a lack of care expected
of a reasonable person in a similar circumstance may satisfy the element of
control if the claimant had the ability to perform satisfactorily.
(b) The Department recognizes that in order to maintain efficiency it may
be necessary to discharge workers who do not meet performance standards.
While such a circumstance may provide a basis for discharge, this does not
mean benefits will be denied. To satisfy the element of control in cases
involving a discharge due to unsatisfactory work performance, it must be
shown that the claimant had the ability to perform the job duties in a
satisfactory manner. In general, if the claimant made a good faith effort to
meet the job requirements but failed to do so due to a lack of skill or ability
and a discharge results, just cause is not established.
In Gibson v. Department of Employment Sec, 840 P.2d 780 (Utah App. 1992), this
court states:
"[The Department rules] defining culpability require a balancing of
the employee's past work record, the employee's length of employment, and
the likelihood the conduct will be repeated against the seriousness of the
offense and the harm to the employer." Id. at 784.
In this case, the claimant had worked for the employer for over two years. During
the last eight months of her employment the employer had received complaints from
coworkers that the claimant was making inappropriate comments concerning employees
and it had a negative effect on the working environment. At one point, in October 2007,
10

the claimant's supervisor had reached the conclusion that the claimant's behavior had
become sufficiently harmful to the employer's rightful interests to necessitate her
termination. Only after reaching an agreement with the claimant that she would amend
her behavior did the employer allow her the opportunity to demonstrate her willingness
to improve.

The employer therefore issued a warning to the claimant instead of

terminating her employment.
The employer issued a subsequent warning to the claimant for similar behavior in
March 2008. The claimant's supervisor discussed the employer's policy regarding
speaking negatively about coworkers and warned the claimant that failure to comply with
the employer's policies would result in termination.
Ultimately, in May 2008, the claimant's supervisor was informed by a coworker
that the claimant had made a racist remark. The supervisor determined this act to be
sufficiently egregious to warrant immediate termination and the claimant was dismissed.
The employer established how the claimant's speaking with fellow employees in a
negative manner, especially with reference to race, was sufficiently serious or harmful to
the employer to justify a denial of unemployment insurance benefits.
The Board correctly considered the totality of the circumstances in determining that
the claimant's conduct was disqualifying. The facts established at the hearing reflect that
the claimant had demonstrated a pattern of behavior which had a seriously negative impact

on the work environment. In this case, the Board determined the employer had met its
burden to establish the three elements of a just cause discharge. Since all of the elements
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of a just cause discharge were established, the claimant was discharged with just cause and
unemployment insurance benefits must be denied.
The actual facts in this case are the basis for the ALTs and the Board's findings and
conclusions. The weight of the testimony and substantial evidence has been outlined
throughout this brief and is adequate to support the Board's decision.
POINT III
THE CLAIMANT PRESENTS NEW EVIDENCE ON
APPEAL WHICH SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED
BY THIS COURT
In her brief to this court, the claimant asserts facts which were not presented at the
hearing or to the Board. Most of the information in the claimant's brief is new evidence.
She has attached many of the exhibits used during the hearing and has appended
explanations to many of them. Those exhibits were made available to the claimant prior
to the hearing and she had an opportunity during the hearing to address each exhibit if she
chose to but she did not.
Prior to the hearing in this matter, the parties were sent an appeal brochure
explaining the hearing procedure. The brochure also advises parties on how to prepare
for a hearing and says, in part:
Preparation for the Hearing
The hearing before the ALJ is your only chance to present everything
relevant to the case. A record of the hearing will be made, and the ALJ may
consider only the evidence introduced during this hearing. Further review
and decisions on appeal are limited solely to the evidence introduced at this
hearing. Take time to prepare for your hearing. Know the issue or issues
involved. Obtain documents that help prove your facts and provide them
12

to the ALJ and opposing party. Also, be sure to line up witnesses which
support your side of the case, [emphasis in original]
The parties were also sent an instruction sheet entitled "Hearing Notice
Instructions". That sheet states, in part:

PREPARING FOR THE HEARING:
In order for the Judge to make the best decision, the judge must hear all of
the relevant information about the issues listed on the Notice of Hearing.
Be prepared to present all the information you want the Judge to consider.

WITNESSES:

If you wish to have someone testify, you must arrange
for that person to be available at the time of the
hearing. The best witness has firsthand knowledge
of what he or she is testifying about. . ..

DOCUMENTS:

Enclosed are documents that may be made part of the
hearing record. . . .
If you have additional documents to be considered by
the Judge, you MUST mail, fax, or hand-deliver the
documents to the Judge and all other parties before
the hearing. . . .
Documents not provided in a timely manner may
not be considered by the Judge.

IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTION PERTAINING TO THE HEARING,
CALL THE APPEALS UNIT AT 801-526-9300 or 877-800-0671.
[emphasis in original]
The administrative law judge also told each of the parties, at the beginning of the
hearing, to be sure and present all the evidence the party wants to be considered during the

hearing.
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Department rules provide:
R994-508-305.

Decisions of the Board.

(2)
Absent a showing of unusual or extraordinary circumstances,
the Board will not consider new evidence on appeal if the evidence was
reasonably available and accessible at the time of the hearing before the
ALJ.
The new evidence in the claimant's brief was known at the time of the hearing and
the claimant could have presented that evidence at that time. The claimant has not given
any reason why this new evidence was not presented during the hearing. She has not
shown extraordinary circumstances which would justify admission of this evidence now.
Accepting this new evidence would deprive the employer of its right to confront witness
and rebut testimony. The "facts" as alleged in the claimant's brief should not be
considered.
POINT IV
THE
CLAIMANT'S
ALLEGATIONS
OF
DISCRIMINATION ARE NOT RELEVANT AND ARE
NEW EVIDENCE.
The claimant included documents in her brief which appear to be filings with the
Utah Anti-Discrimination Division of the Utah State Labor Commission. It appears the
claimant has filed a complaint with that division alleging age discrimination and sexual
harassment. There is no evidence in the record of this case to support an allegation of
discrimination or harassment. Additionally, discrimination is not relevant here. The
claimant was discharged for a long history of behavioral problems including disruptive
gossiping about other employees. The final incident occurred when she used racist
14

language which was so offensive to Ms. Baker that she reported it to the supervisor. The
claimant was not discharged because of her age; she was discharged because of her
behavior.
POINT III
THE CLAIMANT FAILED TO MARSHAL THE
EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF HER ARGUMENTS
THAT THE ALJfS FINDINGS WERE INCONSISTENT
WITH THE EVIDENCE AND THAT THE ALJ
ABUSED HER DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY.
The claimant's brief does not address the finding that she used the word "nigger"
or that the employer's witnesses were more credible. In order to successfully challenge
these findings, the claimant "must demonstrate that the findings are not supported by
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the court." The
court should reject the claimant's appeal for her failure to marshal the evidence in support
of her conclusion that the findings were without foundation. The Board recognizes that
the claimant is proceeding pro se and might not be held to the strict procedural standards
expected of claimants who are represented by counsel. However, the burden when
challenging a factual finding is an extremely heavy one and the claimant has presented no
evidence or arguments sufficient to overcome this burden.
In Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), the Court refused to
entertain the appellant's factual challenges since the appellant failed to meet its marshaling

burden:
[The Appellant] has neither marshaled the evidence in support of the
finding nor demonstrated that the finding is clearly erroneous, but instead
15

cites only evidence that supports the outcome she desires. See Crooks ton
v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 800 (Utah 1991) (citing only evidence
favorable to one's position "does not begin to meet the marshaling burden.
.."). We therefore assume that the record supports the finding of the
trial court. Id. at 820. (Emphasis added)
This court expanded upon the appellant's burden to marshal the evidence in
Oneida/SLICv. Oneida Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051 (UtahCt. App.
1994):
Utah appellate courts do not take trial courts' factual findings lightly. We
repeatedly have set forth the heavy burden appellants must bear when
challenging factual findings. Id. at 1052.
The court reasoned that to successfully appeal a trial court's findings of fact,
"appelhite counsel must play the devil's advocate. '[Parties] must extricate [themselves]
from the client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's position.'" Id. at 1053, citing West
Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The Court
further explained that proper marshaling requires the challenger to:
... present in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent
evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant
resists. West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah
App. 1991); accord/« re Estate ofBartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989);
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191,193 (Utah 1987); Commercial Union Assocs.
v. Clayton, 863 P.2d29,36 (Utah App. 1993); Ohline Corp. v. Granite Mill,
849 P.2d 602, 604 (Utah App. 1993). Oneida at 1053.
Then, after an appellant has established:
. . . every pillar supporting their adversary's position, they then "must ferret
out a fatal flaw in the evidence" and show why those pillars fail to support
the trial court's findings. West Valley City, 818 P.2d at 1314. They must
show the trial court's findings are "so lacking in support as to be 'against the
clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly erroneous.'"
Bartell, 116 P.2d at 886 (quoting Walker, 143 P.2d at 193). Oneida at 1053.
16

The claimant here has made no attempt to meet her marshaling burden. She has
pointed to no evidence in the record to show that the findings of the Board are so "against
the clear weight of the evidence" that they are "clearly erroneous." Instead, the claimant
argues alleged facts that were not in evidence before the ALJ or the Board. The record
below is supported by the evidence and entitled to a presumption of validity. See also
Grace Drilling Company v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 67-68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989),
where this court held that:
. . . the 'whole record test' necessarily requires that a party challenging the
Board's findings of fact must marshal all of the evidence supporting the
findings and show that despite the . . . contradictory evidence, the findings
are not supported by substantial evidence.

CONCLUSION
The claimant has raised no competent argument to show the Board's decision is
either unreasonable or irrational. The determinations of fact made by the Board are
neither capricious nor arbitrary and are well supported by the evidence and testimony in
the record. The claimant was discharged with just cause and the decision of the Board
should be upheld.
Respectfully submitted this

day of December, 2008.

Attorney for Respondent
Workforce Appeals Board
Department of Workforce Services
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ADDENDUM A

35A-4-508. Review of decision or determination by division — Administrative law
judge — Division of adjudication -- Workforce Appeals Board —
Judicial review by Court of Appeals — Exclusive procedure.
(8)(a) Within 30 days after the decision of the Workforce Appeals Board is issued,
any aggrieved party may secure judicial review by commencing an action in the court of
appeals against the Workforce Appeals Board for the review of its decision, in which
action any other party to the proceeding before the Workforce Appeals Board shall be
made a defendant.

ADDENDUM A

63G-4-403. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative
proceedings.
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of agency action
with the appropriate appellate court in the form required by the appellate rules of the
appropriate appellate court.
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern all additional
filings and proceedings in the appellate court.
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial review
of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, except that:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or
organize the record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and copies for the
record:
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or
organize the record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's record,
it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by
any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action is based, is
unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process,
or has failed to follow prescribed procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a decisionmaking body or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the
agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole
record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the
inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the
inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
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78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction,
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of
state agencies or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative
proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax
Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of
Forestry, Fire and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the
Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
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35A-4-307.
(1)

Social costs — Relief of charges.
Social costs shall consist of those benefit costs defined as follows:

(a)
Benefit costs of an individual will not be charged to a base-period
employer, but will be considered social costs if the individual's separation from that
employer occurred under any of the following circumstances:
(i)
the individual was discharged by the employer or voluntarily quit
employment with the employer for disqualifying reasons, but subsequently requalified
for benefits and actually received benefits;
(ii)
the individual received benefits following a quit which was not attributable
to the employer;
(iii) the individual received benefits following a discharge for nonperformance
due to medical reasons; or
(iv) the individual received benefits while attending the first week of mandatory
apprenticeship training.
(b)
Social costs are benefit costs which are or have been charged to employers
who have terminated coverage and are no longer liable for contributions, less the amount
of contributions paid by such employers during the same time period.
(c)
The difference between the benefit charges of all employers whose benefit
ratio exceeds the maximum overall contribution rate and the amount determined by
multiplying the taxable payroll of the same employers by the maximum overall
contribution rate is a social cost.
(d)
Benefit costs attributable to a concurrent base-period employer will not be
charged to that employer if the individual's customary hours of work for that employer
have not been reduced.
(e)
Benefit costs incurred during the course of division-approved training
which occurs after December 31, 1985, will not be charged to base-period employers.
(f)

Benefit costs will not be charged to employers if such costs are attributable

(i)

the state's share of extended benefits;

(ii)

uncollectible benefit overpayments;

to:
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(iii) the proportion of benefit costs of combined wage claims that are chargeable
to Utah employers and are insufficient when separately considered for a monetary eligible
claim under Utah law and which have been transferred to a paying state; and
(iv) benefit costs attributable to wages used in a previous benefit year that are
available for a second benefit year under Subsection 35-4-401(2) because of a change in
method of computing base-periods, overlapping base-periods, or for other reasons
required by law.
(g)
Any benefit costs that are not charged to an employer and not defined in
this subsection are also social costs.
(2)
Subsection (1) applies only to contributing employers and not to employers
that have elected to finance the payment of benefits in accordance with Section 35A-4309or35A-4-311.
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35A-4-405. Ineligibility for benefits.
Except as otherwise provided in Subsection (5), an individual is ineligible for
benefits or for purposes of establishing a waiting period:
(2)(a) For the week in which the claimant was discharged for just cause or for an
act or omission in connection with employment, not constituting a crime, which is
deliberate, willful, or wanton and adverse to the employer's rightful interest, if so found
by the division, and thereafter until the claimant has earned an amount equal to at least six
times the claimant's weekly benefit amount in bona fide covered employment.

ADDENDUM A

R994. Workforce Services, Unemployment Insurance.
R994-405.

Ineligibility for Benefits.

R994-405-201.

Discharge - General Definition.

A separation is a discharge if the employer was the moving party in determining
the date the employment ended. Benefits will be denied if the claimant was discharged for
just cause or for an act or omission in connection with employment, not constituting a
crime, which was deliberate, willful, or wanton and adverse to the employer's rightful
interest. However, not every legitimate cause for discharge justifies a denial of benefits. A
just cause discharge must include some fault on the part of the claimant. A reduction of
force is considered a discharge without just cause.
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R994. Workforce Services, Unemployment Insurance.
R994-405.

Ineligibility for Benefits.

R994-405-202. Just Cause.
To establish just cause for a discharge, each of the following three elements must
be satisfied:
(1)

Culpability.

The conduct causing the discharge must be so serious that continuing the
employment relationship would jeopardize the employer's rightful interest. If the conduct
was an isolated incident of poor judgment and there was no expectation it would be
continued or repeated, potential harm may not be shown. The claimant's prior work
record is an important factor in determining whether the conduct was an isolated incident
or a good faith error in judgment. An employer might not be able to demonstrate that a
single violation, even though harmful, would be repeated by a long-term employee with
an established pattern of complying with the employer's rules In this instance, depending
on the seriousness of the conduct, it may not be necessary for the employer to discharge
the claimant to avoid future harm.
(2)

Knowledge.

The claimant must have had knowledge of the conduct the employer expected.
There does not need to be evidence of a deliberate intent to harm the employer; however,
it must be shown the claimant should have been able to anticipate the negative effect of
the conduct. Generally, knowledge may not be established unless the employer gave a
clear explanation of the expected behavior or had a written policy, except in the case of a
violation of a universal standard of conduct. A specific warning is one way to show the
claimant had knowledge of the expected conduct. After a warning the claimant should
have been given an opportunity to correct the objectionable conduct. If the employer had
a progressive disciplinary procedure in place at the time of the separation, it generally
must have been followed for knowledge to be established, except in the case of very
severe infractions, including criminal actions.
(3)

Control.

(a)
The conduct causing the discharge must have been within the claimants
control. Isolated instances of carelessness or good faith errors in judgment are not
sufficient to establish just cause for discharge. However, continued inefficiency, repeated
carelessness or evidence of a lack of care expected of a reasonable person in a similar
circumstance may satisfy the element of control if the claimant had the ability to perform
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satisfactorily.
(b)
The Department recognizes that in order to maintain efficiency it may be
necessary to discharge workers who do not meet performance standards. While such a
circumstance may provide a basis for discharge, this does not mean benefits will be
denied. To satisfy the element of control in cases involving a discharge due to
unsatisfactory work performance, it must be shown the claimant had the ability to perform
the job duties in a satisfactory manner. In general, if the claimant made a good faith
effort to meet the job requirements but failed to do so due to a lack of skill or ability and a
discharge results, just cause is not established.
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R994. Workforce Services, Unemployment Insurance.
R994-508.

Appeal Procedures.

R994-508-305.

Decisions of the Board.

(1)
The Board has the discretion to consider and render a decision on any issue
in the case even if it was not presented at the hearing or raised by the parties on appeal.
(2)
Absent a showing of unusual or extraordinary circumstances, the Board will
not consider new evidence on appeal if the evidence was reasonably available and
accessible at the time of the hearing before the ALJ.
(3)
necessary.

The Board has the authority to request additional information or evidence, if

(4)
The Board may remand the case to the Department or the ALJ when
appropriate.
(5)
A copy of the decision of the Board, including an explanation of the right to
judicial review, will be delivered or mailed to the interested parties.
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DEBBIE G HAGGARD
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SALT LAKE CITY UT 84128-3545

Notice:
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5/29/08

SSN XXX-XX-X931
EMPLOYER ACCENT SURf-ACES

This decision is made on your claim for benefits:

You were discharged from your job for inappropriate behavior which was in conflict with your employer's rightful interests
You were discharged from your job for just cause Your conduct was within your control and was adverse to your employer's
frightful interests You had knowledge of your responsibilities to your employer or your employer's expectations and you knew or
should have known the possible adverse effects of your conduct on your employer
Benefits are denied under Section 35A-4-405(2)(a) of the Utah Employment Security Act beginning May 18 2008 and ending when
you have earned wages in bona fide covered employment equal to at least six times your weekly benefit amount and you are
otherwise eligible To reopen your claim you can file on-line at jobs ulah gov or you can call the Claim Center This reopenmq will
be effective as of the week you reopen your claim You will be notified separately of any other issues on your claim
RIGHT TO APPEAL If you believe this decision is incorrect, appeal by mail to Utah Department of Workforce Services, Appeals
Section, PO Box 45244 Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0244, or Fax (801) 526-9242, or online at www jobs Utah gov Your appeal must
be in writing and must be received or postmarked on or before June 13, 2008 An appeal received or postmarked after June 13
2008 may be considered if good cause for the late filing can be established Your appeal must be signed by you or your legal
representative MAKE SURE YOUR NAME IS WRITTEN LEGIBLY AND THAT YOU INCLUDE YOUR SOCIAL SECURITY
NUMBER AND CURRENT ADDRESS Also, please state the reason for your appeal A copy of your appeal will be sent to any
other interested parties It is very important for you to continue to file your weekly claims while the appeal process is pending You
will not be paid for any weeks not filed timely unless you can show good cause for late filing
UTAH CLAIMS CENTER PHONE NUMBERS S L . 526-4400, Ogden 612-0877, Provo 375-4067, Out of Area* (888) 848-0688
REPR J Fruin

EMP # 2022

DO NOT WRITE BELOW THIS LINE

•4606256*
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Decision of Administrative Law Judge

Appellant

Respondent

DEBBIE G HAGGARD
6422 W 3860 S
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84128-3545

ACCENT SURFACES
%NATL EMPLOYERS COUNCIL INC DBA
PO BOX 4816
SYRACUSE NY 13221-4816

S.S.A.NO:

CASE NO:

XXX-XX-7931

APPEAL DECISION:

08-A-03756

The claimant is denied unemployment insurance benefits.
The employer is relieved of charges.

CASE HISTORY;
Appearances:
Issues to be Decided;

Claimant/Employer
35A-4-405(2)(a)
35A-4-307

Discharge
Employer Charges

The original Department decision denied unemployment insurance benefits on the grounds the claimant was
discharged for inappropriate behavior. That decision also relieved the employer's benefit ratio account for
benefits paid to the claimant.
APPEAL RIGHTS: The following decision will becomefinalunless, within 30 days from June 26,2008,
further written appeal is received by the Workforce Appeals Board (PO Box 45244, Salt Lake City, UT
84145-0244; FAX 801-526-9244; or online at http://www.jobs.utah.gov/appeals) setting forth the grounds
upon which the appeal is made.
FINDINGS OF FACT:
The claimant worked in the accounting department. On September 19, 2007, the claimant engaged in an
email correspondence with a coworker in which the claimant made inappropriate remarks about coworkers
using foul language. On January 21, 2007, the claimant acknowledged receipt of employer policy that
prohibited this type of communication. As a result of this incident, in conjunction with the claimant's poor
relationship with her supervisor and reports of making disparaging remarks in reference to other employees,
Suzanne Martin, the comptroller, was prepared to discharge the claimant on October 22,2007. The claimant
committed to improve her behavior and the decision to discharge the claimant was changed to a warning.
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Following this incident, the claimant's behavior improved temporanly> but Ms Martin eventually began
receiving complaints that the claimant was talking negatively about coworkers and spreading rumors
Ms Martin confronted the claimant about the complaints on March 18, 2008, but the claimant denied the
allegations Despite a lack of evidence, the claimant was warned that spreading rumors and talking
negatively of coworkers would not be tolerated
On May 8, 2008, the claimant was asked by Ms Martin to retrieve some files, which the claimant felt was
not her responsibility The claimant commented to Michelle Baker, a receptionist, "I guess that you and I
are Suzanne's little niggers" Ms Baker reported the remark to Ms Martin on May 12, 2008
1 he employer employs individuals of vanous ethnic backgrounds and it cannot tolerate racial remarks due
to the psychological impact it might have on certain employees This type of communication is also covered
in the employer's policy and is grounds for immediate termination The final incident was evaluated and the
claimant was discharged on May 15, 2008
REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW;
Unemployment insurance benefits must be denied if the employer had just cause for discharging the
employee In order to havejust cause for discharge pursuant to Section 35 A-4-405(2)(a) there must be fault
on the part of the employee involved The basic factors as established by the Rules pertaining to Section
3 5 A-4-405(2)(a) which are essential for a determination of ineligibility under the definition ofjust cause are
(a)
Culpability The conduct causing the discharge must be so serious that continuing
the employment relationship would jeopardize the employer's rightful interests
(b)
Knowledge The worker must have had a knowledge of the conduct which the
employer expected
(c)
control

Control The conduct causing the discharge must have been within the claimant's

The claimant denied making the remark cited by the employer, but claims that she made the following
remark,M1 guess that you and 1 are Suzanne's little you know whats," and by "you know whats" she meant
"gophers" Ms Baker testified without hesitation that the claimant said "niggers" The claimant admitted
to engaging in a disparaging email correspondence in September 2007 in which she referred to coworkers
in a negative manner using foul language Taking the September event into consideration, Ms Baker's
testimony that the claimant used a racial slur is considered more credible than that of the claimant The word
used by the claimant is universally understood to be extremely provocative and use of such a word in the
workplace contributes to a hostile work environment It was within the employer's right to enforce its policy
which does not tolerate this type of comment in the workplace Culpability is shown
The claimant acknowledged receipt of the employer's policy which prohibits the use of offensive «md racially
charged language in the workplace The claimant also agrees that she was warned for similar behavior in
connection with an email correspondence that occurred September 19, 2007 The claimant should ha\e
known that making a racially sensitive remark could jeopardize her job Knowledge is shown
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The claimant's choice of words was within her control. Control is shown.
Based on a preponderance of the evidence, the employer has established the three elements ofjust cause and
benefits are denied.
An employer may be relieved of charges when the claimant was separated from employment for reasons
which would have resulted in a denial of benefits under Section 35 A-4-405( 1) or Section 35 A-4-405(2) of
the Utah Employment Security Act. In this case the reason for the claimant's separation is disqualifying;
therefore, the employer is relieved of charges.
DECISION AND ORDER:
The original Department decision denying the payment of unemployment insurance benefits pursuant to
Section 35A-4-405(2)(a) of the Utah Employment Security Act is affirmed. Benefits are denied effective
May 18,2008, and continuing until the claimant has worked and earned at least six times her weekly benefit
amount in bona fide covered employment and is otherwise eligible.
The employer is relieved of liability for charges in connection with this claim, as provided by Section 35 A-4307 of the Utah Employment Security Act.

Roman Rubalcava
Administrative Law Judge
DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SERVICES
Issued:

June 26,2008
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WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD
Department of Workforce Services
Division of Adjudication

D E B B I E G. H A G G A R D , C L A I M A N T

S.S.A.No.XXX-XX-8140

:
:

ACCENT SURFACES,
EMPLOYER

Case No. 08-B-00321

:

DECISION OF WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD:
The decision of the Administrative Law Judge is affirmed.
Benefits are denied.
The Employer is relieved of benefit charges.
HISTORY OF CASE:
In a decision dated June 27, 2008, Case No. 08-A-03756, the Administrative Law Judge affirmed
the Department decision and denied unemployment insurance benefits to the Claimant effective
May 18, 2008. The Employer, Accent Surfaces, was eligible for relief of benefit charges in
connection with a future claim.
JURISDICTION OF WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD:
The Workforce Appeals Board has authority to review the Administrative Law Judge's decision
pursuant to §35A-4-508(4) and (5) of the Utah Employment Security Act and the Utah
Administrative Code (1997) pertaining thereto.
CLAIMANT APPEAL FILED: June 27, 2008
ISSUES BEFORE WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD AND APPLICABLE PROVISIONS
OF UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT:
1.

Did the Employer have just cause for discharging the Claimant pursuant to the provisions of

§35A-4-405(2)(a)?
2.

Is the Employer eligible for relief of charges pursuant to the provisions of §35A-4-307(l)?

FACTUAL FINDINGS:
The Workforce Appeals Board adopts in full the factual findings of the Administrative Law Judge.
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REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The Claimant worked for the Employer in its accounting department. The Claimant had some issues
relating to getting along with her coworkers. The Claimant was nearly discharged in October 2007
over an email she sent referring to one of her coworkers as an "ass." The Employer elected not to
discharge the Claimant after she committed to improving her attitude. The Claimant's attitude
improved for a period of time, and then began to deteriorate again, and the Employer began receiving
complaints regarding the Claimant. The final incident occurred when the Claimant, who was upset
about having to locate some files for her supervisor, told another employee, "I guess you and I are
Suzanne's little niggers." The Employer discharged the Claimant, and the Administrative Law Judge
found the discharge was for just cause.
On appeal to the Board the Claimant takes exception with the findings of fact of the Administrative
Law Judge. Specifically, the Claimant argues that she never made the comment about being
"Suzanne's nigger." The Claimant maintains that she said that she was "Suzanne's little you-knowwhat." When parties present conflicting testimony the Administrative Law Judge must make a
credibility determination. Here the Administrative Law Judge found the testimony of the Employer's
witnesses to be more credible than that of the Claimant. The Board, on appeal, will generally not
disturb the credibility determination of an Administrative Law Judge absent clear error, whereas the
Administrative Law Judge is able to listen to the testimony and question the witnesses, unlike the
Board who reads the record. The Board has reviewed the record in this case and finds that the
testimony and evidence supports the credibility determination of the Administrative Law Judge and
there is no clear error which would justify reversal of the credibility determination of the
Administrative Law Judge.
Next the Claimant goes tlirough each of the emails submitted by the Employer and refutes or
explains each email. The emails were all prior lo the Claimant's near termination in October 2007
and do not relate to the final incident. The emails reflect the interpersonal problems the Claimant
had with her coworkers and supervisor, and Further support the credibility determination of the
Administrative Law Judge. The Claimant argues that the emails show that other employees were
using profanity and gossiping and were not disciplined by the Employer. The Claimant maintains
the Employer sought to discharge her. While it is true that several of these email do contain
profanity by others, there is no testimony or evidence to support the Claimant's allegation that these
employees were not disciplined. It is speculation on the part of the Claimant. Furthermore, the final
incident in which she referred to herself and another coworker as "Suzanne's little niggers," was
significantly more serious than the language used in the emails. Given the Claimant's past conduct
and the warning she received from the Employer regarding professionalism in the workplace, when
the Claimant made the final comment it was necessary for the Employer to discharge the Claimant
in order to protect its rightful interest.
The Board affirms the decision of the Administrative Law Judge and adopts in full his reasoning and
conclusions of law.
{
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DECISION:
The decision of the Administrative Law Judge denying unemployment insurance benefits to the
Claimant effective April 27, 2008, under the provisions of §35A-4-405(2)(a) of the Utah
Employment Security Act, is affirmed.
The Employer, A Plus Benefits, is eligible for relief of benefit charges in connection with this claim
as provided by §35A-4-307(l) of the Act.
APPEAL RIGHTS:
Pursuant to §63-46b-13(l)(a) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, you may request
reconsideration of this decision within 20 days from the date this decision is issued. Your request
for reconsideration must be in writing and must state the specific grounds upon which relief is
requested. The request must be filed with the Workforce Appeals Board at 140 East 300 South,
Salt Lake City, Utah, or may be mailed to the Workforce Appeals Board at P.O. Box 45244,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0244. A copy of the request for reconsideration must also be mailed to
each party by the person making the request. If the Workforce Appeals Board does not issue an
order within 20 days after the filing of the request, the request for reconsideration shall be considered
to be denied pursuant to §63-46b-13(3)(b) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. The filing
of a request for reconsideration is not a prerequisite for seeking judicial review of this order. If a
request for reconsideration is made, the Workforce Appeals Board will issue another decision. This
decision will set forth the rights of further appeal to the Court of Appeals and time limitation for
such an appeal.
You may appeal this decision to the Utah Court of Appeals. Your appeal must be submitted in
writing within 30 days of the date this decision is issued. The Court of Appeals is located on the
fifth floor of the Scott M. Matheson Courthouse, 450 South State Street, P. O. Box 140230,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230. The appeal must show the Workforce Appeals Board,
Department of Workforce Services and any other party to the proceeding as Respondents. To file
an appeal with the Court of Appeals, you must submit to the Clerk of the Court a Petition for Writ
of Review setting forth the reasons for appeal, pursuant to §35A-4-508(8) of the Utah Employment
Security Act; §63-46b-16 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act; and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, followed by a Docketing Statement and a Legal Brief as required by Rules
9 and 24-27, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing DECISION to be sen'ed upon each of the following on
this 31st day of July, 2008, by mailing the same, postage prepaid,
United States mail to:
DEBBIE G HAGGARD
6422 W 3860 S
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84128-3545
ACCENT SURFACES
%NATL EMPLOYERS COUNCIL INC DBA PEO
PO BOX 4816
SYRACUSE NY 13221-4816

Ellen Lambert
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JUDGE

Along with the hearing notice, documents the Department used to make the original
decision were mailed to both parties. I am referring specifically to documents marked
as Exhibits 1 through 39. Ms. Haggard, do you have those documents with you now?

CLAIMANT

I do.

JUDGE

Mr. Hunter, do you have those documents?

HUNTER

I do.

JUDGE

Mr. Kirby, do you have those documents in your office?

KIRBY

I do.

JUDGE

And Ms. Martin, do you have those documents with you?

MARTIN

Yes.

JUDGE

I am going to identify each document for the record. After I am done I will ask if either
party has any objections to me considering these documents today. The first four
exhibits is a print out of the claimant's initial unemployment claim. Exhibit #1
indicates the claim was opened May 15, 2008. Exhibit #2 shows responses to eligibility
questions. At the bottom of Exhibit #2 it indicates the claimant reported her last
employer as Accent Surfaces, last day of work April 15,2008 and reason for separation
was discharge. Exhibit # 3 shows instruction given after the claim was opened and
Exhibit # 4 is the final page of instruction. Exhibits 5 and 6 are both titled Official
Notice of Claim Filed. Exhibit # 5 indicates the last day of work as reported by the
employer was May 15, 2008 and that the claimant worked in accounting. Exhibit # 6
the employer reported reason for separation was discharge. It also specifies the claimant
was discharged for inappropriate conduct. Claimant made comments of a racial nature.
Documentation to follow. I'm showing this was completed by Nicole Turrow. Mr.
Hunter, is she an employee of National Employers' council or of Accent Surfaces?

HUNTER

She is an employer of National—an employee of National Employers' Council.

JUDGE

So the information she reported on this form was provided by Accent Surfaces?

HUNTER

Correct.

JUDGE

Exhibit # 7 is titled Termination Notice, showing Ms. Haggard's name and social
security number and the date is May 15, 2008. It goes on to specify the comment that
Ms. Haggard made that resulted in her termination. At the bottom I'm showing a
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signature dated May 15, 2008 but I cannot read the signature. Whose signature is that,
Mr. Hunter?
HUNTER

Urn—

JUDGE

Should I ask Mr. Kirby?

HUNTER

You may want to ask Mr. Kirby, yes.

JUDGE

Mr. Kirby, whose signature is that?

KIRBY

That is the signature of Suzanne Martin.

JUDGE

Ms. Martin, can you confirm that is your signature?

MARTIN

Yes it is.

JUDGE

Exhibit #8 is the second page of the Termination Notice, indicates items to be
collected from the claimant. Exhibit #9 is an email from Ashley Jensen to Suzanne
Martin with an attachment showing an email from the receptionist to Ashley Jensen.
That email—those two emails are both dated May 12,2008. Exhibit #10 is a page from
the employer's policy book titled "Your Work Environment" specified the conduct
while at work. And Exhibit #11 is another page from the employer's handbook
regarding harassment. Exhibit #12 is the employee's acknowledgment of receipt of the
employee handbook. I'm showing a date that it was signed was January 16th of 2006.
Ms. Haggard, is that your signature?

CLAIMANT

Yes it is.

JUDGE

Exhibit #13, I'm showing an email from Ashley Jensen to Suzanne Martin. This is on
April 23, 2008. Exhibit 14 is employee counseling report, dated March 18, 2008
regarding Debbie Haggard. This indicates continuing to talk about people behind their
back and being negative at work. It says "Plan of action: this behavior needs to stop
immediately." And I'm showing a signature which appears to be Ms. Martin's
signature again. Is that your signature, Ms. Martin?

MARTIN

Yes.

JUDGE

This document does not show a signature by Ms. Haggard. Exhibit #15 is another page
of email, this one from February 7, 2008. There is more than one email on this page but
it appears to be a correspondence between Ashley Jensen and Suzanne Martin. Exhibit
#16 is the second page to that email. However there is no writing on it other than the
words 'thanks' and the social security number. Exhibit #17 is a termination notice.
This is a different termination notice which was dated October 22, 2007 with the
6
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notation to not terminate "Debbie says she will work on her attitude, we will give her
one more chance." The bottom in typed letters indicates the form was completed by
Suzanne Martin. Exhibit 18 is the second page to that termination notice. Exhibit 19 is
a page from the employer's uh hand—uh policy book which refers to their
communications systems. Specifically you cannot use company communication
systems to transmit, receive, store information material or communication that is
obscene, discriminatory or rude, etcetera. Exhibit 20 is another acknowledgement of
the receipt of that handbook. This is also dated January 16,2006. This appears to be a
copy of the other acknowledgment page. Would you agree with that, Ms. Martin?
MARTIN

Yes.

JUDGE

And Ms. Haggard, is that your signature again?

CLAIMANT

Yes.

JUDGE

Exhibit 21 is an email from Ashley Jensen to Suzanne Martin dated October 19, 2007.
This goes on to describe information about the claimant Ms. Haggard, discussions
overheard by Ashley Jensen. Exhibit—our next few exhibits are a bunch of emails so
I'm just going to go through them as fast as I can. Exhibit 22 is an email between
Ashley Jensen and Suzanne Martin in regards to information for Michelle Baker.
However, I may need more explanation on this one as we get further into the hearing
because these emails from Angela Olson are in - the font that she uses I cannot read it.
It's very unclear in my copies.

CLAIMANT

Same with mine.

JUDGE

Is that Ms. Haggard?

CLAIMANT

Yes. Yes, I have a really hard time and one I couldn't even hardly read.

JUDGE

Exhibit 23 is another email. This is also from Angela Olson, this one dated October
19, 2007.1 can't read that one. Exhibit 24 is another email from Angela Olson which I
cannot read. Exhibit 25 is the second page of the email from Exhibit 24. Just for the
record the email on Exhibit 24 is dated October 2nd, but it actually appears to be two
emails from Angela Olson, started on Exhibit 24, as well as one email on Exhibit 24
from Ashley Jensen. And the email from Angela Olson continued over to Exhibit 25.
Starting with Exhibit 26, um, or actually Exhibit 26 is an email from Debbie Haggard
to the receptionist. There are two emails on here. The second email is from the
receptionist to Debbie Haggard. This appears to be communication about some of the
employees who had taken a lunch break.

CLAIMANT

Yeah, and actually.
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I'm not going to ask for explanation now.
The receptionist is actually first and the second one is mine. You've got to go
backwards.
The date on this is September 19, 2007.1 think it's the next three or four exhibits
starting with Exhibit #27 appears to be communication between Courtney Baker and
Debbie Haggard, having a discussion about some other employees in the office via
email. This took place on September 19,2007. Exhibit 27 is the end to the
communication showing the last email was sent from Courtney Baker to Debbie
Haggard at 9:22 AM on September 19, 2007. Exhibit 28 is the earlier emails, um,
between Ms. Baker and Ms. Haggard. Exhibit 29 again is earlier emails in that
conversation between the two employees. And Exhibit #30 would be the start of that
communication. I'm showing that it was started from Courtney Baker to receptionist
Debbie Haggard. That was started at 7:57 AM September 19, 2007. Exhibit 31 is
entitled Separation Statement Discharge. This would be response to the claimant information the claimant provided online when she opened her claim, as well as a
description of a conversation between the Department representative and the claimant.
Exhibit 32 is thefirstpage of a statement of job discharges the claimant filled out on
which she indicated her last day of work the 15th of May and she goes into some detail
about the reason for separation. Exhibit 33 is a letter typed by the claimant that was
sent along with that questionnaire that she filled out, in which she describes the events
that led up to her termination. Exhibit 34 is the second page to that letter. Exhibit 35 is
the third page to the letter as well as her signature. Is that your signature Ms. Haggard?
Yes it is.
Exhibit 36 is the second page to the claimant's statement of job discharge - the form
which she completed. And is that your signature on the bottom of the form, Ms.
Haggard?
Yes it is.
Exhibit 37 is entitled Decisions Details. This would be the Department
representative's reasoning for denying unemployment insurance benefits. Exhibit 38 is
the decision letter that was mailed to the claimant indicating that benefits were denied.
And Exhibit 39 is the claimant's appeal. It was filed online on May 30th, 2008. Ms.
Haggard did you prepare this appeal yourself?
I did.
That is the end to our exhibits for the hearing. Ms. Haggard do you have any objection
to me considering these documents as I make my decision today?
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CLAIMANT

No.

JUDGE

Mr. Hunter do you have any objection to me considering these documents as I make
my decision today?

HUNTER

No objection.

JUDGE
CLAIMANT

Exhibits 1 through 39 are entered into the record. Mr. Haggard (sic) based on the
evidence you have, what was the reason the claimant was ultimately discharged?
Are you talking to me?

JUDGE

Mr. Hunter?

CLAIMANT

Oh, Mr. Hunter.

HUNTER

Uh, the reason for her discharge were inappropriate comments made about another
employee.

JUDGE

Okay, now as we proceed perhaps you prefer that I question your witnesses regarding
this?

HUNTER

Urn, it is probably best you ask the questions of Mr. Kirby.

JUDGE

Okay. Mr. Kirby, are you there?

KIRBY

I am here.

JUDGE

Are you the one who discharged the claimant?

KIRBY

I am.

JUDGE

Based on the documents we have it appears her last day of work was April 15, or May
15, 2008. Is that the same day that termination took place?

KIRBY

Yes it is.

JUDGE

What was the reason she was terminated?

KIRBY

For making an inappropriate remark at work. Specifically she mentioned that her and

the receptionist were Suzanne's 'little niggers.'
JUDGE

Who was the receptionist that this comment was made to?
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MARTIN

I was told that Michelle Baker had told Ashley that this comment was made to her.
And when Ashley told me, Ashley is Michelle's direct supervisor, and then I am
Ashley's direct supervisor. So Ashley told me' and I asked her if she would ask
Michelle to send an email summarizing what—stating what was said.

JUDGE

Okay we already have Exhibit #9 which is that email, correct?

MARTIN

Right, that's what that came from. So she, Michelle, sent that email to Ashley and then
Ashley forwarded it on to me. And then I actually sent it on to my boss who is the
CEO to make a decision.

JUDGE

Are you referring to Chad Kirby or someone else?

MARTIN

No, my boss is David Hill. He's the CEO of the company.

JUDGE

Okay. And again, you did not witness this comment being made?

MARTIN

I did not.

JUDGE

I'm going to question Ms. Baker later on about that comment since you don't have any
personal knowledge of that event that took place. I want to move on to something you
might know personally. Have you ever given Ms. Haggard any warnings about the type
of language she used at work or any inappropriate discussions she might have at work.

MARTIN

Yes.

JUDGE

When was the last time you warned her?

MARTIN

We talked on March 18,1 think that was that verbal warning one, the copy that's in
there.

JUDGE

Can you refer me to that, please?

MARTIN

Yes, sorry.

CLAIMANT
MARTIN

Exhibit 14.
Right. Exhibit 14.

JUDGE

Okay. Exhibit 14 I'll indicate again this indicates—this states continuing to talk about
people behind their backs and being negative in the work environment. Can you tell
me what instigated this warning?

MARTIN

(no response)
11
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JUDGE

Ms. Martin?

MARTIN

Yes, yes, I'm sorry. Right. Um, I had heard that she was saying—we have several
different departments in our office. Customer services department, accounting
department, and I had heard her saying that the customer service people weren't doing
their job. And didn't really know what they were doing and getting away with doing
nothing.

JUDGE

Did you have a discussion with her about these rumors that you had heard?

MARTIN

Yes.

JUDGE

What did you explain to her in this discussion?

MARTIN

Well we had previously spoke and that was that other termination back in October
that—

JUDGE

We'll get to that one in just a moment.

MARTIN

It's just—I was referring to that and said that, you know, things had gotten better that
now it sounded like, um, she was falling back into talking about people and it just
needed to stop because we have a policy around here that we don't talk about other
people. Especially not negatively. And it needed to stop.

JUDGE

During that meeting did she express any concern about what she was complaining
about?

MARTIN

She denied that she'd said anything.

JUDGE

Is there a reason you did not have her sign the warning?

MARTIN
JUDGE

Because I was, yes, because I was considering it a verbal warning I didn't have her
sign it.
At the bottom of the page, Ms. Martin, it indicates failure to comply with the plan of
action will result in termination. That indicates the plan of action which states verbal
warning, written warning, suspension, formal probation for a period of so many days.
Um, is this a plan of action that is routinely followed by the employer?

MARTIN

Yes.

JUDGE

So after the comment that occurred on May 15, is there a reason the next step was not
taken in the plan of action, rather than termination?
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MARTIN

I'm sorry, say that again.

JUDGE

I'm looking—I'm sure—it appears to me that there is a progressive plan of action as
indicated on the bottom of this form on Exhibit 14. I'm not showing any other warning
similar to this one as part of my records today so I'm wondering if there's a reason, as
a result of the comment that took place on May 15 the employer jumped from verbal
warning to termination rather than taking the steps of written warning or even
suspension.

MARTIN

The comment that was made on May—to Michelle, on whatever date, May 12, it was
all in that email, was more egregious than anything else that had been done. It wasn't
talking about people behind their backs; it wasn't necessarily related to the other
things that had happened. It's an outright violation of our policy of our standards at
work. We have a mixed race company and our ownership is very adamant about the
fact that we are not a racial, racist company. And so it was—and so it was felt by the '
ownership that any racial comment in and of itself was grounds for dismissal. Even if
there hadn't been any other incident prior.

JUDGE

Okay. So we have the verbal warning that took place on the 18th. You also made
mention of the prior incident in October where you were going to terminate her but
you did not. Before we discuss that was there anything that occurred between October
and this March 18th warning that was documented?

MARTIN

No.

JUDGE

Had you had any discussions with her between that time regarding her demeanor at
work or her talking negatively about other employees?

MARTIN

No.

JUDGE

Can you tell me what incident led up to the itici—uh, to the tie you were going to
discharge her in October of 2007?

MARTIN

I'm going to refer to the email that started back in Exhibit (pause) 21 and on. Um,
there was many times of, uh, her talking badly about other employees and these were
documented—they were never sent to me, I never was privy to these.

JUDGE

Okay, let's go through them real quick just so I can get an understanding. Because
these are a lot of the emails that I didn't know what she was talking about.

MARTIN

Right.
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JUDGE

Okay, you'll be given an opportunity to testify in a few moments. You can give your
difference of opinion at that time, okay?

CLAIMANT

Okay, thank you.

JUDGE

Make sure you're taking notes so you don't forget what you want to say.

CLAIMANT

Okay.

JUDGE

Ms. Baker, are you there?

BAKER
JUDGE

Yes.
Ms. Baker I want to address primarily the final incident with you. It's been reported by
Ms. Martin that the comment which resulted in the termination of the claimant was
made to you. Is that correct?

BAKER

It was.

JUDGE

Okay I want to refer back to the email which you wrote regarding that incident which
is Exhibit #9. In this it shows an email from Ashley Jensen to Susan Martin dated
April 2008. Did you write this email?

BAKER

I did.

JUDGE

In this email it goes on to describe what comment Ms. Haggard made to you. Can you
explain—can you tell me what comment that was?

BAKER

Um, she came down to ask me if I could help her find some files that she was asked to
find and, um, she was—I was making a copy, uh, the paper that she had been given to
find the files. And she came up to me and said that - she got up to me really close and
said that - she said, "I guess that you and I are Suzanne's little niggers." And it kind
of took me back back—

JUDGE

Did she use that word specifically. Or did she use another word that might have
alluded to that - to something - to a negative word?

BAKER

No sir, that word specifically. And I made sure. I asked her again and she said that
again. So. It was that exact word.

JUDGE

After that comment was made to you what did you do?

BAKER

I asked her to repeat it again and she did.
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JUDGE

You've already told me that you asked her to repeat it. What I want to know is after
you asked her to repeat it what did you do?

BAKER

I kind of just sat back and was shocked and she walked away and so I-I didn't know
what to do really.

JUDGE

Did you report it to somebody?

BAKER

Yes I did, I reported it to Ashley.

JUDGE

Ms. Baker, were you involved in any of the other communications that Ms. Martin
referred to earlier in the hearing?

BAKER

No, just the emails that were sent back and forth.

JUDGE

Okay let me check through these real quick, (pause) Okay I don't have any other
questions for you, Ms. Baker. Mr. Hunter, do you have any questions for Ms. Baker?

HUNTER

Nothing for Ms. Baker.

JUDGE

Ms. Haggard, do you have any questions for Ms. Baker.

CLAIMA1
CLAIMANT

No, like I said, just response.

JUDGE

Ms. Jensen, are you there?

JENSEN

Yes.

JUDGE

What was your relation to the claimant at work?

JENSEN

What was that?

JUDGE

What was your relation to the claimant while at work, to Ms. Haggard?

JENSEN

Supervisor.

JUDGE

Di you ever give Ms. Haggard any warnings?

JENSEN

I did not.

JUDGE

Were you involved in any of these email communications that Ms. Martin isreferring
to that were negative communications?

JENSEN

Yes.
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